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1 May 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 14/81)



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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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AFGHANISTAN

GRENADE LAUNCHER TAKEN IN AFGHANISTAN

LD011129 London THE GUARDIAN in English 1 Apr 81 p 4

[Dispatch by "our own correspondent": "New Soviet weapon Captured"]

[Text] Peshawar--One of the latest Soviet infantry support weapons, brought into service last year and previously seen only in shadowy, snatched photographs, has been captured in Afghanistan and is now in Western hands.

It is an AGS30, a collapsible grenade launcher capable of working like a machine-gun and throwing out grenades at the rate of 300 per minute, to a maximum range of 1,500 yards.

Defence experts believe this weapon has seriously eroded the Western technological lead in medium-range support for infantry. It is also known as the Playmya, the Russian word for "flame."

The Soviets are using the Afghan war as a proving ground for much of their latest equipment, including items so far restricted to the Red Army. In clashes with the Mojahedin (Muslim rebels) some inevitably are being captured.

If the guerrillas are uncertain what the weapons are, or if they do not have sufficient ammunition for them, the booty is brought over the mountains into Pakistan, and offered for sale in this northwest frontier city, or in the gunshops of the nearby tribal town of Barra Adam Khel.

Already the West has been able to examine the latest Soviet assault rifle, the AK74 together with its special ammunition which tumbles on penetration, causing appalling wounds.

It is not known how long the AGS30 has been in service in Afghanistan. The implication is that it must be fairly recent, because there are no reliable reports of a new and potentially devastating weapon in use. The Soviets will presumably begin to deploy it in earnest when the snows melt and the tempo of fighting picks up.

The avtomaticheskii granatomjot stankovi is operated by a crew of two or three. It collapses down to fit into two separate bags and is equipped with an optical sight of advanced design.

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The grenades themselves look like thick bullets, and are understood to have a lethal zone with a radius of just over 10 feet. Because of its mounting and rapid-fire capabilities, the AGS30 can shift targets swiftly, causing considerably more damage than any machine-gun because of the pattern of shrapnel fragments from each of the exploding grenades.

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LEBANON

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AMONG VARIOUS SECTS URGED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Feb 81 pp 19-21

[Article: "Who Crucified Christ in the Lebanese War? The Option of Political and Social Change by Force Is Not Possible in a Country That Has 16 Sects and Denominations"]

[Text] In their confrontation with the Resistance and the National Movement the Maronites lost many times more what they would have lost in a confrontation with Israel.

Palestinian excesses weakened popular sympathy for the Palestinians, and the Maronites used that as an excuse to bear arms against the Resistance.

Palestinians forgot to consider that the United States was capable of finding an Arab alternative to its direct intervention in Lebanon.

During the last visit that Lebanese leader, Kamal Junblat made to Damascus, Mr Junblat told 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, the Syrian minister of foreign affairs, "In a few days we will invite you, Abu Jamal, for lunch with us in Bikfayya."

Bikfayya is the home town of Pierre al-Jumayyil, the leader of the Lebanese Phalangist party. At that time the Palestinian forces and their allies, the Lebanese National Movement were close to the mountain town.

Khaddam smiled a diplomatic smile, but he did not answer.

Events then succeeded each other rapidly. Bikfayya did not fall, and the Syrian troops continued their advance in the al-Biqa' valley and in north Lebanon. Then they climbed the mountain and descended on Beirut. The Palestinian forces and the National Movement fell back in front of them, and 1 year after their entry into Beirut Kamal Junblat himself was assassinated.

Junblat is a rare kind of leader. He used to triumph over all his associates in politics with his mastery of the fundamentals of the traditional Lebanese political game. At the same time he was able to extend his

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bridges beyond his Druze sect and establish close communications with the intellectuals and the new generations of other sects. He was helped in this by a daring intellect, a thorough education, an eminent personality, a noble spirit and a sincere faith in Arabism. Junblat was aspiring to the establishment of a unified Lebanese society wherein a flexible socialism would provide social justice that would be broader than the manifestations of false prosperity in which Lebanon has been living.

It may be that these aspirations which Junblat had before his contemporaries and associates in Lebanese politics were at some point--and after a long period of hesitation about carrying weapons--the incentives that made him believe that force was the means for imposing political and social change in Lebanon, or rather, on the Christian Maronite sect which is the more powerful and the wealthier sect as well as the ruling sect in Lebanon.

It may be that eating a meal in the home town of al-Jumayyil symbolizes in Junblat's mind and imagination the destruction of the political and economic control as well as the psychological control that al-Jumayyil's sect practised on all the other sects of Lebanon.

Junblat was right: change was inevitable. But Junblat was wrong because force in a country like Lebanon was not the means for bringing about change.

Let us go back and emphasize that [the use of] force was not Junblat's preferred choice; nor was it close to his heart. The evidence for this lies in the fact that when the Lebanese war broke out, Junblat's party and sect did not have the quantity of weapons that could be compared with the quantity of weapons that the other sects or organizations owned. However, the fact that he turned to the option of force occurred later when adversaries and allies tempted and provoked Junblat, his sect and his party. This was after Junblat had seen the easy victories that the Palestinians achieved early in the war and after the voice of the Palestinian leader Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyyad) had echoed, "The road to Palestine goes through Juniyah!" The Palestinian forces were on the mountain tops overlooking this port that used to be considered the last major stronghold of the Maronite militia.

A revolution or [the use of] force may be a suitable tool for bringing about political and social change in a unified country that has a racially and religiously homogeneous and harmonious mass of humanity, a country that is prepared to accept change induced by violence as a result of the prevailing feeling that there was no other choice. And so it was that change was brought about by force in China and European Russia; despite all the tragedies [that accompany it] the violence did not shake the nature of the people and did not do away with their unity and their human and psychological harmony.

Loyalty to the Sect First

But the matter in Lebanon was different. Despite its meager size, area

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and population--3 million people in 10,000 square kilometers--this country has 16 different sects that live in closed ghettos and are subject to a system whose appearance is democratic but whose substance is a manifestation of this incongruous sectarian and denominational division. So much so that the Maronite president of the republic did not consider himself the president of all the Lebanese, but rather the political head of his sect, the protector of its interests and the defender of its supremacy. The case was the same regarding the Sunni prime minister and....

Loyalty to the sect then was the rule and the foundation. Sectarian solidarity was stronger than professional or trade union solidarity. Therefore, arousing sectarian feelings was easier and much more effective than arousing feelings of political injustice or social oppression.

The Maronite sect is a living example of this. Education is sectarian in the home, in the school, in the monastery, in the church, in the party, in life, in business and in the profession: we are a distinctive Christian minority outnumbered by an ocean of Muslims. We are a stronghold of Christian civilization facing the encroachment of the Bedouins of the Sahara. We are the protectors of persecuted Christianity in an Islamic, Arab East. We are the geniuses of trade and culture. We are the beacon of western culture in an ocean of backwardness. We are the elite of a society, an elite that must own, rule, control and prosper.

It is sad that the early Maronite openness to pan-Arab feelings early this century, which manifested themselves in an interest in reviving and refining the literature of the Arabic language and in participating with leading Arab nationalists in the struggle against Ottoman colonialism, was soon dispelled and replaced by sympathy with European colonialism to the degree that Maronites in schools and universities cheered when the army of the newly born Arab state was defeated in Maysalun in 1920 by the French army that was advancing from Lebanon to Damascus. The leader of the French army, General (Gourot) brandished his sword in front of the tomb of the hero who had defeated the Crusaders and exclaimed, "We have come back, Salah al-Din!"

In the climate of this narrow, fanatical education and in such circumstances, it was impossible to fuse the Lebanese sects in a purely nationalistic environment. It had been accepted in advance that the 1943 National Pact had created a false coexistence between the sects that was being protected by a backward, tribal, family, political system and by parties that were in turn sectarian organizations with a Fascist or provocative nature. The leaders, however, remained prisoners of the traditional competition between the influential families that have been in control for hundreds of years.

All this was accompanied by an emotional, intellectual and cultural alienation which was encouraged by missionary and foreign schools for the purpose of separating the Christian sects from their eastern environment and their great Arab homeland. These missionary and foreign schools wanted to attach the Christian sects to the European west by force, diligently

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tearing up national unity and preventing social intermixing. As a result of this, a general sense of distinction was created in these sects, especially in the Maronite sect. They were condescending towards the Arabs [whom they considered] culturally and socially "backward."

The Arab character of Lebanon, the "independent master," was totally rejected. Arabism was merely a material gain to be achieved by tempting Arab tourists with a summer vacation; with exporting apples and industrial products to the Arab countries; with marching on the Gulf to realize enormous fortunes as the black gold gushed [from the earth]; and with help in converting and recycling oil returns to western markets through the channels of Lebanese expertise.

People were not concerned about pan-Arab questions which received mere official or diplomatic verbal support at conferences. There was an ardent desire to remain neutral in the face of the Arab-Zionist struggle under the pretext that Lebanon was weak and incapable of enduring the burdens of a confrontation. ~~[It was argued that] the Arab talk about Israeli expansionism was a mere myth and that Lebanon had patrons and gods distributed in various western capitals that were protecting it.~~

The Palestinian Role in Lebanon

The Palestinian presence in Lebanon increased the complexity of Lebanon's sectarian question. At first, the Palestinian presence was unarmed; however, in time that presence deepened the sense of political injustice and social oppression that the deprived Lebanese sects had, especially the Shi'ite sect. This came about through the direct contact the Lebanese and the Palestinians had with each other in the camps and in the zones of misery that began to surround Beirut and the other principal cities of Lebanon.

Then, when the Palestinians armed themselves after the 1967 defeat and took over their own cause, a principal change occurred in the nature and the role of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Because of its weakness and its sectarianism the Lebanese regime was no longer able to maintain security in the street, to close the confrontation line that the Resistance had opened on the borders or to break the Palestinian alliance with the deprived sects and the destitute groups.

And so it was that all the sectarian, political, social and security conflicts interacted and broke out, especially after Shihabism waned--this is with reference to former Prime Minister Fu'ad Shihab. In the sixties Shihabism had tried to anticipate the explosion by bringing about political and social changes. However, these changes were no more than scratches on the fragile Lebanese surface. They did not go any deeper to become real changes that would remove the deep sense of political and social bitterness.

Nevertheless, the armed struggle did not suddenly become inclusive and

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broad. Preparations for it had been made by heated uprisings that were manifested in tumultuous, tense dialogue between the sects, in scattered clashes with the Palestinians, in the gradual disappearance of the authority and dignity of the state, in the deterioration of security and in the race that sects and organizations had to acquire and bear arms.

Then came the 1973 war which filled the Palestinians with feelings of hope and with the full conviction that [the use of] weapons was the way to liberation. In return, the Christian Maronite side feared an Arab expansion similar to the Nasirist expansion [that had taken place] in the fifties. This time the Palestinians with all their armed presence and their effective presence on the Lebanese scene would be the means of such an Arab expansion.

Maronite parties and organizations soon assumed the initiative, and then contrived and brought about the pre-conceived and pre-meditated major clash of 1975 when they found out that the political system was incapable of protecting the control and the privileges of the sect and when they realized that expediting the clash would be better than waiting for it to happen. They did so to gain time and to forestall further cohesion between the deprived groups and sects.

In all fairness the Palestinians must bear their responsibility in what befell Lebanon without having this affect our absolute faith in the justice of their cause and in their right to struggle for it with all capabilities and means.

The Palestinians did not understand the lesson they learned in Jordan in 1970 and 1971. Carrying weapons did not give them the authority to interfere in the details of the daily life of the average Jordanian or Lebanese citizen. If there is any justification for their allying themselves with social groups against the Lebanese political regime, that would not justify their involvement in breaking and violating the system of rules and regulations that govern the relationship between the citizen and the government and administration.

If these excesses have been and are being reluctantly accepted by the Lebanese Muslim because of his sympathy with the most eminent goal of the Palestinian Resistance and the strategy of the Arab struggle, the Lebanese Maronite did not accept them. Ultimately, the Lebanese Maronite used these excesses as an excuse to bear arms against the Resistance, to oppose the political and social demands of the deprived groups and sects and to challenge Lebanon's Arab ties in order to achieve cooperation and coordination with Israel.

The fragmentation of the Palestinian Resistance and the fact that it has numerous Arab and ideological loyalties prevented it from deriving lessons from what happened to it in Jordan and from anticipating and avoiding what happened to it in Lebanon. When it was provoked by the Phalangist militias and the liberals in the Palestinian bus massacre on 13 April

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1975, it was thought that the Resistance would be capable of achieving an easy victory over the long range by allying itself with the Lebanese National Movement--the Left--and by storming the strongholds of the Maronite ghetto.

However, despite the apparent preponderance of the Palestinian-Leftist side, the easy victory did not come about. The importance of the time factor was absent from Palestinian considerations, and so it was that the delay in a military settlement provided the opportunity for Arab, foreign and Zionist interference.

It may be that the Resistance was correct in not expecting U.S. intervention such as that which occurred in 1958. In the mid seventies the United States was coming out of its bitter defeat in Vietnam and it was determined not to become involved in another military adventure on the shores of Asia. Israel, however, was nursing the wounds it had received from its psychological and moral defeat in the 1973 war, and it was not prepared to carry out a far-reaching adventure in Lebanon.

What was farthest in the expectations of the Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement was an armed Arab intervention in favor of their adversaries. This was a major error in the political and military considerations. The Resistance forgot completely that if the United States was not able to interfere directly, it would be able to find an Arab substitute that can do the job and it would be able to provide it with the protective cover, embellished with various Arab cliches to justify the intervention.

The Secrets, Concomitants and Results of the Syrian Intervention

It may be said that Arab intervention was inevitable so that the useless bloodshed on the Lebanese scene could be brought to an end. This may be true and it may have been necessary as far as principle is concerned. But nobody can absolve the Syrian military intervention from [the guilt of] carrying the protective U.S. cover. There is more than one [piece of] evidence that it was the American green light that was lighting the way for the convoy of tanks and artillery that began penetrating the Syrian-Lebanese borders since March 1976. Little by little they have been advancing in the valley of al-Biq'a, the soft Lebanese heartland, waiting to complete their mission in the highlands and on the coast.

It is enough to say, for example, that at that time Kissinger was at the height of his success in the region after having achieved the disengagement [agreement] on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts. Damascus had been one of his favorite stops in the course of his shuttle tours. Kissinger did not miss an occasion for praising al-Asad's "shrewdness" and Talas's "handsomeness" in his elegant military suit with his medals decorating his chest.

To provide evidence of the doubts about the Syrian role in Lebanon, suffice it to say that the Palestinian Tall al-Za'tar fell during the course of the military advance on Lebanon and at the peak of the strong

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relationship that, despite their differences, had united the regime in Damascus and the Maronite organizations and militias--and at their forefront were the militias of al-Jumayyil and Sham'un.

Suffice it to say, for example, that the Syrian troops never crossed the red line that Israel publicly drew for them in south Lebanon. They never crossed that line, not even when the Israeli troops attacked some sections of south Lebanon in 1978, stopping within sight of the Syrian troops there.

All this would have been of little importance had the Syrian intervention conducted itself well. It soon wasted all the political support it had for the military presence and the Maronite popular support that had at first welcomed it.

The Syrian mistakes in Lebanon constituted a setback for all the slogans and for the substance of the call for Arab nationalism. The National Movement was restrained, and the Palestinian Resistance was struck. It became evident that Damascus had not exacted from the Maronite sect pledges and promises that they would abide by Arab interests and stop dealing with Israel in return for providing them with protection and security.

The Syrian troops became involved with the business of the state and with the details and particulars of the daily lives of the Lebanese and the Palestinian people. All this was accompanied by excesses and challenges to people's feelings and dignity as well as an insistence on playing the part of policemen. This led the Syrian troops to become involved in armed confrontations, and they resorted to the violent, useless shelling of civilian sections. Then they withdrew in front of the Maronite militias before making it possible for the Lebanese state to perform its security and military role and extend its political and legal authority.

Even though the Lebanese regime has shown an ability to play on the delicate balances in Lebanon, an awareness of devising intricate schemes and an understanding of the secrets and concomitants of the traditional political game, it did ignore the historical opportunity that was provided to it to dispel the feelings of fear that "the Christian minority" have of the "Muslim majority" or the "Arab majority" that surrounds them. In fact, the agents, men and officers of the Syrian regime in Lebanon intentionally or non-intentionally provoked sensitivities and feelings by pursuing conduct that was sheer propaganda such as posting a portrait of Hafiz al-Asad--Abu Sulayman--in the middle of (Sasin) square in the Christian eastern section of Beirut and decorating it with various slogans to provoke those with deep-seated narrow sectarian convictions there.

A sincere view of Lebanon on the verge of the sixth anniversary of the disaster that befell it and in the midst of these errors and transgressions that are being committed [against it] by everybody does not inspire optimism. The lawful state is restrained and subject to various factions. The Maronite militias are continuing their plans if not to partition Lebanon, then to further the alienation of the Christians, to isolate them

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from every Arab movement and to place them [on a course] counter to every supreme Arab interest and cause.

Furthermore, the Maronite militias are making the Christians intoxicated with a false sense of pride when they tell them that they will lead them to the full "liberation" of Lebanon. They are thereby committing the same error that the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement committed when they thought that force was the means for imposing change. The Maronite Lebanese Front is forgetting that strengthening the backward political and social status quo and depriving Lebanon's Muslims of their Arab identity is not possible through violence.

The military power of the Palestinian Resistance has grown, but at the same time it has lost much popular sympathy from the Muslim and national Lebanese mainstream because of its inability to control and to police itself, its individuals and its organizations. The Palestinian Resistance was forced to maintain silence on the address of Lebanon's President Sarkis at the recent Islamic summit in al-Ta'if. President Sarkis had leveled serious accusations against the Resistance, and he had overlooked the enormity of the aggression that was being practiced against the legal authority of his state by the Maronite militias.

Support for the Syrian role in Lebanon is dwindling and waning as the internal situation in Syria deteriorates. The Syrian regime transferred its Arab disputes to the Lebanese scene, and it began to behave as though this was merely one of the political fronts that are scattered along the Lebanese sidewalk or as though it were an armed militia practicing kidnapping and liquidation as others are practicing them without an awareness and consideration for its responsibility and its reputation as a state and a regime.

And then,....

Lebanon is still drowning in a maelstrom of violence, and none of the factions can wash its hands of the blood of Christ who is being crucified there daily and repeatedly.

However, placing the responsibility on the shoulders of the concerned parties and factions candidly and courageously without having [other] objectives also requires that one search for a solution. If there is a consensus that an accord is a Lebanese responsibility and that it is the function of the Lebanese people themselves, there must also be an Arab consensus and Palestinian cooperation to help Lebanon avoid the disasters of the predicament in which it has drowned. This is because the Arabs are discovering after 6 years of the tragedy that they are about to lose Lebanon without regaining Palestine.

It may be said that any Arab effort in this regard would be a useless waste of time and money as long as the international and Israeli game is continuing its conspiracy against the peace, the security, the unity and the future of Lebanon.

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This may be true, but is it not possible to fill in many of these open holes?

Yes, it is possible, and it may be that the first thing that must be done in this regard is to fill up the emotional pit that was created by the conditions of the war and the fighting between the Lebanese people.

With all candor and courage, [let me say that] the Arab attention must turn towards the Maronites in particular and the Lebanese Christians in general--the politicians, leaders, deputies, intellectuals, young people and students. They are to be invited to visit the Arab countries and to [take part] in debates and discussions. They are to be emotionally and intellectually persuaded that Arabism is not a monster or an ogre; that it does not wish to hurt or damage the religious or racial minorities that live under its wing; that it does not wish to deprive them of practicing their rites of worship; and that it does not even want to divest them of their sectarian distinctiveness.

It must be admitted that tearing down this barrier of prevailing illusions requires a long time and much effort, but we must [nevertheless] begin to "vent" the grudges that are festering in people's hearts until the Christians of Lebanon become fully convinced that they are living in an Arab environment and climate, no matter how much they deny that, and that the actual and real responsiveness to the hopes and wishes of this environment is the proper avenue for peaceful coexistence with the Arab world and the only road to achieving national solidarity on Lebanese land.

It is the Arab failure to be forthright with the Lebanese Maronite shell that is forcing the Maronites into further isolation and fear and a search for peace and protection from the remote West or from nearby Israel. This strong and vital minority sect must be made to feel that from a pan-Arab point of view it is on the same level of equality and fraternity with any other Arab sect, including the Palestinians themselves. Accordingly, the Arabs are asking the Maronite sect on that basis to consider their feelings and their interests in their struggle to regain their rights and their usurped land. The Arabs are asking the Maronites not to think that history would excuse them from the ethical and even the religious responsibility if they were to try to take advantage of those moments when the spirit of the Arabs is broken to set up alliances with their adversaries and their enemies to strike at the heart of Arab questions and interests.

The loss that would result from such irregular alliances would not only affect the Arabs, but they would also affect the Maronites and Lebanon's Christians in general. As evidence of this suffice it [to cite] that what the Maronites and the Christians lost in the civil war and in the confrontation with the Palestinians is many times more the loss that could have befallen them had their emotions and their guns been allied with the Palestinian and the Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy.

If the Maronites are rejecting violence as a method of confronting the Zionist enemy, it would be more appropriate for them to reject the violence that Bashir al-Jumayyil is talking about today as the way "for

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liberating" Lebanon from the Palestinians and subjugating the deprived and the destitute sects and groups that are asking for political and social equality.

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LEBANON

PROBLEMS FACING INDUSTRY DISCUSSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Feb 81 pp 46-47

[Article: "Lebanese Industry Hopes To Regain Its Arab Markets, but the Problem Is Security, Extortion, Smuggling, Financing and the Absence of the State"]

[Text] Lebanese industry, which had experienced major development since World War II, is trying to get out of the sharp setback from which it has suffered since the outbreak of the Lebanese war. This report summarizes the problems, the hopes and the pains of the industry and its men in Lebanon.

Lebanese industry has been one of the important sectors that were hurt because of the war in Lebanon and because of the problems and difficulties that war left behind, such as customs chaos, the prevalence of smuggling, the instability of the commercial market, the emergence of illegal ports, the rise in the price of the dollar, the fluctuation in currency rates, monetary inflation and the instability of the Lebanese pound.

The magnitude of the losses in the industrial sector is subject to growth if the state of security and political instability continues, especially since Lebanese industry is a growing industry that has not yet built a strong foundation for itself.

Talking about the facts of industry in Lebanon leads one to talk about its past and about the stages of its growth and the circumstances that surrounded that growth. It leads one to review the accomplishments of that industry, especially in the period that preceded the war, which is usually called the golden stage of the Lebanese economy. Then [one comes back to talk about] its present condition after the war.

Lebanon has had basic industries ever since the most ancient history. Among these industries were those of producing purple dye and manufacturing sail boats. World War II is considered the actual date for the birth of the modern Lebanese industry.

Before that war Lebanese industry was confined to a few textile plants, cement plants, food canning plants and a few vocational industries.

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It was natural for Lebanon to try to establish new industries during the war so it could meet the shortage in imports. It was customs protection and the increase in consumption that was the result of the presence of the allied forces which helped this industry develop rapidly.

Between 1945 and 1959 Lebanese industry experienced major development and expansion in exports to the Arab countries. At the same time it suffered from major competition from foreign industries and from their rivalry in local and foreign markets.

Competition and the pressures of Lebanese industrialists on the Lebanese government forced the adoption of the principle of customs protection, especially after 1950.

The food, crafts, leather, textiles and printing and publishing industries were at the forefront of the industries that grew, developed and prospered during that period.

A few official figures may be cited here about the development of Lebanese industry between 1958 and 1973. The number of workers rose from 21,814 workers in 1958 to 68,460 workers in 1968. In 1973 the number of workers rose to 125,000. Capital invested in industry rose from 212.2 million pounds in 1958 to 1.068 billion pounds in 1968. In 1973 that figure rose to 1.5 billion pounds. The value of industrial exports amounted to 1,059 million pounds in 1964; 1,421 million pounds in 1968; and 1,698 million pounds in 1970.

The food industry was first among Lebanese industries regarding the number of organizations, workers, sales and purchases. The non-mineral mining industries were first regarding economic activity. The oil derivatives industry was third in sales distribution. The textile industry, however, was third regarding the number of workers, but it fell back to sixth place in the purchasing market.

The development of Lebanese industry was accompanied by relative changes in the minds of businessmen. This development was also helped by the fact that industrial, financial and human capital emigrated from the Arab countries to Lebanon. It is also known that Lebanese industrial organizations are mostly sole or family proprietorships. It has also been noticed that 41 percent of the industrial organizations are concentrated in Beirut and that 28.3 percent are in Beirut's suburbs.

Lebanese industrialists say that local industry has suffered chronic and conventional problems before the civil war. Chief among these problems were the dearth of industrial credit, the lack of industrial planning, the weakness of statistics and the permanent need for outside markets.

But during the Lebanese war and the paralysis, the absence of security and the absence of the lawful authority that followed the war and continues to exist, the national industry suffered from greater and more

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serious problems. The war destroyed 35 percent of the plants, and production declined during some stages of the war to 20 percent of its pre-war level. Several problems ensued. The most important of them are: debts, financial liquidity, the emigration of labor, a shortage in furnishings and equipment, smuggling and the imposition of extortion and illegal taxes.

The Problems of Lebanese Industry

The current problems may be set forth in some detail:

--Debts: Bank debts continued at high rates of interest, even when 60 percent [of the capital assets] stopped producing. This caused the industrial sector to be in a state of material and production paralysis, and this was the reason behind closing down a few small factories that were not able to establish a balance between their tax obligations and their continued production.

--Financial Liquidity: Inflation weakened the currency and banking market, and this had negative effects on industry. What made the situation worse was the fact that companies were forced to increase the number of workers in the wake of reduced production.

--The emigration of labor: It is estimated that the rate of labor emigration during the war was 55 percent. Although some of the workers have returned during the last 2 years, Lebanese industry is still lacking the experienced and the professional hands that contributed to its development and prosperity before the war.

--The lack of furnishings: Of 1,000 industrial organizations employing more than 10 workers [each], 200 have lost their total capacity for production because of sabotage and theft. Most of the other factories are complaining about a shortage in modern equipment and furnishings and in advanced technology. In addition, there is a shortage in public services, such as telegraph, telex, telephone, electricity and communications.

--Smuggling and extortion: Smuggling is being practiced on a broad scale, especially through the illegal ports, to avoid paying taxes to the state. This has created unequal competition between imported and local products. Corporations and factories are also subject to the pressures of militias and armed men to pay them "protection money." If the state does not take it upon itself to take the measures that are necessary to put an end to the smuggling and the extortion, the destiny of the Lebanese industry in its entirety will be exposed to inevitable danger.

Mr Nabil al-Ladiqi, member of the Society of Lebanese Industrialists says that the direct damages, such as destruction, spoilage and theft, which befell Lebanon's industry during the war are estimated at 20 percent of the value of industrial investments. The indirect damages, however, are manifested in the sharp shortage in labor because of emigration and in the loss of markets that were considered natural and almost closed for

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Lebanese production. Arab countries that imported [goods from Lebanon] turned to other alternative markets, and the necessary infrastructure for the industrial effort deteriorated. This is being manifested in the difficulty of transportation and communication, in the decline in the level of telecommunications services and in the decline of credit.

Mr al-Ladiqi refers to the revival of the Lebanese industry and says that it registered a strong thrust forward in the wake of the return of relative calm in 1977. This was the result of the boldness and the courage of the Lebanese industrialist, of the financial terms that were provided by the state, such as loans, and then of the state's establishment of a national organization to ensure new investments against non-commercial dangers. This made the importation of new equipment easy. This new awakening is evident in the rise of the value of industrial exports to 1,892 million Lebanese pounds (1,140 million pounds in 1974 prices); that figure rose to 2,158 million pounds in 1979.

However, the components of growth for the Lebanese industry have not yet become available. It is the opinion of Mr al-Ladiqi that Lebanese industry still needs to meet the labor shortage; it needs to fight smuggling; and it needs to provide financing.

Mr Fu'ad Abu Salih, president of the Society of Lebanese Industrialists is hoping that the current year will be the year during which Lebanon will regain its economic health through a development plan that includes the industrial sector.

The Lebanese industrialist summarizes industry's demands from the state by saying that security has absolute priority. It is followed by the construction of an infrastructure, such as providing water, electricity, telecommunications, postal services, transportation and communications, and then assistance in the repayment of previous debts and granting adequate credit to get the wheel of industry moving. He estimates the value of these loans to be half a billion pounds.

Fu'ad Abu Salih gives the question of guiding industrial production special attention. This is because the local market is too narrow for the aspirations and the production of the Lebanese industry. But then he goes back to say that the marketing problem will solve itself as soon as production capacity is restored. What he means by this is that Arab markets will continue to experience an increase in population growth, and, consequently, their ability to buy and to consume [will also increase.]

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LIBYA

MILAN PAPER CITES AL-QADHDHAFI TV INTERVIEW

LD080859 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 6 Apr 81 p 5

[Unattributed report on Chairman of Libyan Revolutionary Command Council Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi 5 April TV interview]

[Text] Rome--Interviewed last night by Maurizio Costanzo on independent channel one [television] Libyan leader Al-Qadhafi said that "the Red Brigades should abandon the method of clandestine struggle and work within legality instead." The lengthy and interesting interview is the first in the new monthly series "People Like That" and will be shown again Sunday.

"The Red Brigades," Al-Qadhafi said, "are regarded as a terrorist organization, but perhaps their origins stemmed from social causes." "They are," he added, "an organization created by Italian society."

The Libyan leader stressed, however, that he is "opposed to terrorism in Italy and opposed to any kind of terrorism throughout the world." In this connection he explained that he regards as terrorism not only armed action by groups such as the Red Brigades, but also actions such as "the hijacking of aircraft, the manufacture of nuclear bombs, the presence of naval units in other countries' territorial waters."

With regard to Italy, Al-Qadhafi said, without further explanation, that there is "internal" and "external" terrorism here.

Answering a question from Maurizio Costanzo, he said that if he were to give the Red Brigades a piece of advice, it would be to reject the armed struggle method: Instead of acting clandestinely with erroneous methods they should come out into the open and try legally and peacefully to persuade people of the worth of their ideas. The Red Brigades can and must emerge from clandestinity and promote their idea without using terrorist systems...because there is a difference between revolution and terrorism.

The Libyan colonel explained that he considers the manufacture of the nuclear bomb "a crime." He added: It is the countries that continue to manufacture nuclear bombs that, for propaganda purposes, are accusing other countries of wanting to manufacture such bombs. "The entire world public," Al-Qadhafi continued, "must exert pressure on the major powers to halt the manufacture of nuclear weapons."

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Answering a question about whether, and if so when, he will visit Italy, Al-Qadhdhafi said: Well, the visit is not definite yet. The Italian Government should set a date. However, I am willing to make this visit as long as there is agreement, at least in principle, on the Libyan people's right to be compensated for all the damage suffered during the war as a result of the Italian presence in Libya.

To the question "Do you prefer Reagan's America or Carter's?", the Libyan leader replied: Reagan's. He explained that this was "because we have already tried Carter, whose policy proved useless both for the United States and for the rest of the world."

[Question] What do you think of President Pertini?

[Answer] I believe that Pertini is a very good man.

[Question] Is that all?

[Answer] Yes, that is all.

[Question] And what do you think of Pope Wojtyla?

[Answer] He is a new pope.

[Question] Do you intend to meet with him?

[Answer] Why not.

Al-Qadhdhafi added that "judging by appearances the papacy has become leftwing."

The leader explained this claim by saying that "the pope is Polish and Poland is a Marxist country...." "... it seems to me that he is finding convergences between Catholicism and leftwing stances and I also believe that he has influence over events in Poland. I mean moral influence."

Asked why in an interview he described Italy as an American colony, Al-Qadhdhafi replied: "First, my definition is based on the fact that there are U.S. bases in Italy. Second," he continued, "in our relations with Italy we have managed to observe that there are some things which could be done in the Italian people's interests but which the Italian Government cannot do without U.S. permission."

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LIBYA

SOVIET EXPERTS AID ARMY DESPITE MUTUAL DISLIKE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Jan 81 p 25

[Article by Mohamed Selhami: "Indispensable Though Hated"]

[Text] Without his Marxist allies al-Qadhdhafi would have been unable to carry out his Chadian expedition successfully. Without al-Qadhdhafi the Soviets would never have been able to tread the soil of N'Djamena. Tripoli and Moscow are "objective allies" who maintain close and exemplary relations, especially at the military level: Libya has been provided with ultramodern arms which the Kremlin has not even supplied to its "friends" in East Europe.

Behind the Scenes

To say "arms" is to say "military experts and advisers." There are approximately 8,000 of these experts and advisers (representing the largest Soviet colony in the Muslim world except for Afghanistan) distributed throughout Libya. These experts--who range in rank from noncommissioned officer to lieutenant-colonel--are engaged in basic training, guerrilla training, and training in equipment maintenance. Some of them work within the official system--the bases, schools, barracks and military training centers. The majority of their trainees and students are natives, but among them you will also find scholarship recipients sent by the African countries within the framework of cooperation: Beninese, Togolese, Malagasy, Congolese, Mozambicans and Guineans. The most recent arrivals are the Zimbabweans (10 in number) who have been taken in hand at the Misrata air base and aviation school. Situated in the eastern part of the country, this base was built in 1980--by the Soviets. It functions in connection with a center for training in the use of anti-aircraft missiles which was opened on the same date, also at Misrata.

Other experts operate behind the scenes. They reinforce the staff of the camps that are reserved to the "combatants of Islam," providing classical military training, and advanced training in guerrilla warfare, for thousands of recruits and African refugees (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 997). The Soviets accord particular attention to this "Islamic army," which consists of a group of "potential liberators": in other words, infiltration elements, some of whom have already given proof of their competence in Chad.

Ghadames, Zounjour, Az Zaouiah, Sebha and about 10 other camps employ in this capacity a total of more than 4,000 Soviet experts, whose term of duty is not much more than 6 months. Nevertheless, they prefer these African "trainees" to the natives,

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who are poorly disciplined and self-centered. The Libyan authorities frequently have to punish their students in response to complaints from the instructors, who moreover must not under any circumstances form friendships with their "trainees."

#### Their Hand Is In

The advisers, for their part, have more freedom in this respect. Their rank (that of colonel or higher) enables them to frequent the upper levels of Libyan policy. They can be found within the commands of battalions, brigades and divisions, and it is at Tripoli and Benghazi that they are the most numerous. Every Libyan field officer is accordingly flanked by a Soviet adviser who under the terms of the contract may participate in all his decisions, both in time of peace and in time of war. All the military academies and military schools have Soviet advisers who take part in the planning and choice of programs and teach courses. Soviet advisers are also present in certain key ministries: Transport, Energy, Planning, Petroleum, Interior and (of course) Defense.

#### The Hated Allies

The Soviet community in Libya is required to report to no one other than its staff--a small elite group installed in Tripoli on the very premises of the embassy, which is endowed with sophisticated equipment that enables it to communicate with Moscow at any given moment. The experts and advisers are housed gratis; they live in buildings which are closely guarded by their own watchmen. Bachelors for the most part, they receive very few "strangers" without authorization from their staff office. They have their own cinema, library, game room and vodka. They are absolutely forbidden--regardless of their rank--to employ native aides.

Curiously enough, the experts are paid more than the advisers: the equivalent of 10,000 FF [French francs] (500,000 CFA francs) per month as opposed to 7,000 FF (350,000 CFA francs) per month. Libya (contrary to the practice in poorer countries such as Syria and Ethiopia) defrays the expenses of these salaries. The money is paid to the Soviet Government, however, which then distributes it after withholding 40 percent of the total amount.

Libya and the Soviet Union are "objective allies," to be sure; but that does not prevent the men involved from cordially detesting each other.

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LIBYA

FRENCH DIPLOMAT GIVES HIS IMPRESSIONS OF AL-QADHDHAFI

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Feb 81 pp 34-37

[Interview with French ambassador to Iran Guy Georgy by Sennen Andriamirado and Francois Soudan]

[Text] Inducing Guy Georgy--the 62 year old former director of the African Affairs section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently French ambassador in Teheran--to talk is an exercise that delights newsmen. This master diplomat, who is privy to the secrets of African politics, knows better than anyone the secret of the brilliant strategies that lead to high office.

Guy Georgy's encyclopedic knowledge of the continent and his very individual interpretation of human relations (an interpretation which has not always pleased the Quai d'Orsay)--which together form the basis of his diplomatic demarches and analyses--make him a veritable mine of information. Six years (1969-1975) spent in Tripoli as France's representative to Colonel al-Qadhdhafi qualify him better than anyone else to discourse on the personality and ambitions of the Libyan chief of state.

Guy Georgy came to JEUNE AFRIQUE to speak to us, with intensity, of the man who "wants to unite everyone who lives in a tent."

[Question] You, Guy Georgy, are among those Western diplomats who know Colonel al-Qadhdhafi best.

[Answer] I spent 6 years in Libya and have often said I have always felt a certain liking for him: he is a sincere and engaging man. I realize, of course, that his natural shortcomings cause people to speak ill of him. He doesn't have the same handrails to grasp, nor the same latitude of choice, that we have in Europe. His interpretations are simple and always reflect Bedouin concepts.

[Question] Is it that he himself is simple, or is he a simplifier?

[Answer] He is a simplifier. Al-Qadhdhafi is in no way simple. He is a very intelligent man. He has simple explanations for things, however. One day he said to me: "The Anglo-Saxons are men of the forest: in all of their literature they see only trees. They are secluded; they have no vision, and so they 'tinker' with their souls. They are always practicing self-analysis and meddling in areas that do not pertain to them, for these areas pertain to God. Your soul belongs to God."

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[Question] What does he say about French literature?

[Answer] According to him, the French opened clearings in their original forest much earlier than the English did in theirs, and consequently have a literature that is more open. Al-Qadhdhafi traveled to the Anglo-Saxon countries and said: "It's hellish! I couldn't live here. How can anyone meditate in a country where clouds are always hanging over your head?" Al-Qadhdhafi, don't forget, is a man of the desert: he needs space!

[Question] He needs it so much that he wants the entire Sahara!

[Answer] It is his view that the Sahara is the last area where frontiers are not rigidly fixed, for it is the desert. Everyone seems to think the Sahara is an imaginary line separating the so-called "north of Sahara" countries from the "south of Sahara" countries. It isn't a line, though; it's a belt of terrain based on 16 degrees latitude that extends 5,000 kilometers all the way from Cap Blanc to the Gulf. It isn't because it lacks trees, though, that it isn't a rich territory! The Sahara is certainly less fertile for growing garden peas, but from the standpoint of energy and minerals the Sahara is just as interesting as any other country!

[Question] Al-Qadhdhafi regards the Sahara as a country?

[Answer] It is a country. It is a country that is to this day little known but of vast dimensions. Some of its inhabitants live a nomadic existence there the year round. They number 4 million to 5 million people who heretofore did not communicate among themselves because of the distances involved but who today--thanks to the advent of transistors and minicassettes--are participating in world society. The impact of the transistor can never be exaggerated. Today, the Great Marabout comes right into one's own home!

[Question] One can accordingly have his al-Qadhdhafi every day: al-Qadhdhafi can henceforth communicate with the entire desert.

[Answer] The people of the Sahara are listening in on the world. They know everything that's going on in the Arab world. They're becoming aware that they are not alone. Who are these people? They are the Reguibet, who are causing much talk inside POLISARIO; the Tuareg, whose families are scattered throughout the desert, especially in Mali and Niger; the Toubou, who are a part of Ethiopian society; and the people of southern Egypt. As you can see, there are tens of tribes involved!

[Question] Tribes which al-Qadhdhafi would like to unite.

[Answer] Al-Qadhdhafi would certainly like to unite everyone who lives in a tent, everyone who is a nomad. This is al-Qadhdhafi's other distinguishing characteristic. He is a nomad, and therefore someone who does not enjoy a sedentary existence. He is a man of the sands, and for him the desert is an element with which he is in permanent conflict.

I have often wondered--as I look at him--what he is thinking about. For example, even though he is in no sense a farmer he has ordered wells dug in the desert and has brought water to the surface. Afterwards, he will go for a walk all by himself, with a grin on his face. I always imagined that on these walks he was issuing a challenge to the dunes.

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[Question] His current challenge would appear to be this effort of his to unite all these Saharans. Do you think the Sahara might some day constitute a country: a state such as al-Qadhdhafi would like it to be?

[Answer] I've always thought the POLISARIO episode was the first venture on the part of this Sahara of tomorrow. The only thing is that the Polisario people came to the station to take the train 2 years too late. They will not reach their destination. It's unfortunate, because the great sacrifices, the great courage, they have demonstrated deserve respect.

They should actually have come to the station in 1973. Today, they may shoot the stationmaster, take children hostage and make promises--but they will not get to their destination. Moreover, the impression today is that their effort is "unraveling"--for the fact is that the conflict is above all a conflict between Algeria and Morocco.

[Question] Lots of people are interested in this Sahara: Algeria, Morocco and al-Qadhdhafi. Al-Qadhdhafi is reportedly in the process of moving his pawns into Mali. What does he intend to do there?

[Answer] Al-Qadhdhafi doesn't want to move into Mali as a conqueror any more than he does into Niger, unless he can do so through the intermediary of the Saharan populations: in this case, the Tuareg and the populations living on the border of the Sahel. I tell you, the Sahara is the last great venture in Africa. That's because everywhere else on the continent Africa is henceforth confined within its existing boundaries.

[Question] Is al-Qadhdhafi a dangerous man?

[Answer] He has a certain power, a certain impact. Because of the simple concepts which he professes with such profound faith, he has today an impact on this vast country we call the Sahara and even somewhat beyond, in the Arab world.

As you know, al-Qadhdhafi attaches a great deal of importance to books. Because of books he has some admirable convictions. He's not a weak person. He holds the degree of licentiate in history and has read a great deal. He has even read with enthusiasm all the theoreticians of European nationalism. He has read Marx. He read Mazzini and Cavour in preparation for his history degree. He continues to read, with the aim of refining his message.

[Question] In certain French circles al-Qadhdhafi is regarded as France's Enemy No 1, precisely because he does have this impact.

[Answer] For my part, I'm always skeptical of this sort of cliché. He isn't Enemy Number One. He has principles. He believes that colonialism is finished, that the systems involving direct exploitation of human beings and political domination are dead. It's a theoretical concept, and that fact always makes me smile a little. After all, though, al Qadhdhafi does have a continental theory!

He said to me: "Africa is not your continent: you have no business there." So I said to him: "You are speaking to someone who represents a people whose freedom

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twice in one century depended on the intervention of another continent. Continental solidarities and unique characteristics do exist, and they are not taboo to anyone."

Al-Qadhdhafi believes we have no role to play in Africa, although he recognizes that we do have interests and traditions there and that because civilization equates with trade we cannot be excluded. He realizes that Libya has represented a transition between the West and the East: it is a country through which Phoenicians, Romans, Greeks, Arabs and Sicilians have marched. He realizes that civilization means mixing.

Moreover, you can see that in Africa the area that interests him first and foremost is Chad. Now that our troops are no longer patrolling in Chad he has made declarations of friendship to us.

[Question] It is even said that he proposed a deal to you to divide Chad into zones of influence.

[Answer] He made a proposal of that sort a long time ago. I don't know how many times he has told his conversational partners: "In Chad, leave me my Muslims and I'll leave you your Negroes."

[Question] What is he doing in Chad? It isn't his country, after all.

[Answer] I asked him that on one occasion. He replied: "What do you mean, it's not my country? That's exactly what it is: my country." To him it is the land which his cousins have traditionally roamed. During the last century the history of the two countries overlapped to a great extent.

Al-Qadhdhafi regards the northern part of Chad as--if not categorically a Libyan region--at least a country which is so bound up with Libya, so coincident with Libya, that it is a completely normal thing for Libyans to be present there. This is why--against all international logic--they are occupying the Aouzou strip with a clear conscience.

[Question] He's not looking for either petroleum or uranium there?

[Answer] No, no. Al-Qadhdhafi is not looking for uranium in particular, nor for petroleum. He moreover believes that petroleum is going to kill the Arabs, because petroleum encourages them to be somewhat lax. According to al-Qadhdhafi, in order to be combative one must be like the people of the desert: made of iron wire.

[Question] But where would he be without petroleum?

[Answer] He believes petroleum is a gift from Allah. Those Arabs who have been ill-behaved have no petroleum; those who have behaved correctly do.

[Question] Let's return to the subject of Chad. By law it's a state with a population, with frontiers.

[Answer] Chad isn't delimited by the will of its people but rather by the borders of its neighbors. It's something like the missing piece of a puzzle: the piece that's easiest to see because it's missing.

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[Question] Can it be said that the rival factions, the armed bands, are a part of Chadian "civilization?"

[Answer] There have always been such bands in Chad! Even in the contemporary era the government has always been highly personalized. Today we are having to deal with the chiefs of such bands much more than with men who have a sense of nationhood.

[Question] Is Hissein Habre the chief of a band?

[Answer] Of course! He's a chief who has acquired a better education than his predecessors. He's an authentic chief of a band, and in that capacity he is a fascinating figure. He's active, dynamic and intelligent and has known how to use the media. Remember the Claustre affair. He's an adventurer who is haunted by his passion for absolute power.

For this reason he cannot allow any discussion or seek any consensus. Chad, on the other hand, is supposed to submit to the consensus of the Northern peoples, plus several other peoples who will inject themselves into the picture. That's the way things are in Africa!

[Question] Does France know what it wants in Chad?

[Answer] France knows what it would like to have. It would have liked to have a government of national union in which the principal forces of the country would have been represented on an approximately equitable basis. It is probably regrettable, therefore, that we did not give more support to a man such as Goukouni--without substituting ourselves for him. For the "Libyan affair" has its limits--very tight limits! I know a little about Libya, but I understand very well what these limits are!

[Question] By Libya you mean al-Qadhdhafi. Can anyone reason with him, though?

[Answer] Al-Qadhdhafi has his strong points and his faults, and he also has his limitations. Despite his ardent desire, al-Qadhdhafi has never been able to "mount the horse of the Caliph." He has a little donkey! It isn't because he's had his shoes gilded that he's able to make all these tours on horseback. His dream is Oumrah--Arab unity. Never, though, has the Arab world been more divided than it is today.

[Question] But al-Qadhdhafi is interested only in the Arabs and in the desert, although some say he is also interested in the forest: in Central Africa or Uganda.

[Answer] Let's be serious about this. I say that's not so. He went to Uganda because Idi Amin was a Muslim; he went there for the sake of Muslim solidarity. He had taken steps to found an Islamic bank there, and he had drawn up plans for a school of agriculture.

[Question] These Libyan promises of aid are never carried out.

[Answer] If you want to engage in agriculture, don't in any case look to the Libyans! Likewise, if you want to have an army don't ask them to organize one!

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The Libyans are not soldiers: they are shepherds of the desert and traders. What al-Qadhdhafi wants is to convert as many people as possible to Islam. It is Islamic proselytism that inspires him. He wants to spread the word of God.

[Question] Then there is no Libyan threat in Africa?

[Answer] Except for Chad--for reasons which I have explained to you--al-Qadhdhafi wants nothing. He wants the Sahara; he is obfuscated by the Sahara.

[Question] Isn't there a kind of imperialist rivalry between Nigeria and Libya?

[Answer] I don't think so. They are not neighbors and have no reason to be rivals. Even in Chad, you see, al-Qadhdhafi is in reality "electioneering" only for the Muslims of the North.

I say to you again: al-Qadhdhafi is not seeking an empire. He is not an imperialist. The danger lies within each one of these "cauldrons" of Africans.

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